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Abstract We introduce here a family of mixed coalitional values. They extend the
binomial semivalues to games endowed with a coalition structure, satisfy the prop-
erty of symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property, generalize the
symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value introduced by Alonso and Fiestras and link and
merge the Shapley value and the binomial semivalues. A computational procedure
in terms of the multilinear extension of the original game is also provided and an
application to political science is sketched.
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1 Introduction
The parallel axiomatic characterization stated by Feltkamp (1995) shows that the only
difference between the Shapley value (1953) and the Banzhaf value (Owen 1975), as
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allocation rules for all cooperative games, is that the former satisfies efficiency whereas
the latter satisfies the total power property. Differences of this kind become important
when one is facing a group decision and negotiation problem and wishes to choose
a suitable allocation rule for solving the problem. The properties of a value should
always be a main argument for either selecting it or rejecting it in each particular case.
In the framework of cooperative games with a coalition structure, other essential
differences also arise between the Owen value (1977) and the modified Banzhaf value
or Owen–Banzhaf value (1982). The Owen–Banzhaf value fails to satisfy the property
of symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property, which are satisfied
by the Owen value.
Alonso and Fiestras (2002) suggested a modification of the Owen–Banzhaf value
that satisfies these two properties and can therefore be compared with the Owen value
in terms analogous to Feltkamp (1995). Our aim here is to introduce the notion of
coalitional binomial semivalue as a wide generalization of the Alonso–Fiestras value
(essentially: p ∈ [0, 1] instead of p = 1/2) in order to get the family of symmetric
coalitional binomial semivalues that still satisfy the property of symmetry in the quo-
tient game and the quotient game property, so that they differ from the Owen value
just in satisfying a total power property instead of efficiency. These new values are
especially suited for the study of cooperative games where the players show some
(common) tendency as to the size of the coalitions they would agree to form. This
tendency is defined by parameter p. Let us include a motivating example.
Example 1.1 In Sect. 5 we apply this family of values to the analysis of an interesting
political problem: the Catalonia Parliament during Legislature 2003–2007, prema-
turely finished in 2006. Curiously, the analysis remains still valid for Legislature
2006–2010 since, in spite of the modification of the seat distribution issued from the
elections held in November 1, 2006, the strategic possibilities are exactly the same.
In Catalonia, politics is based on two main axes: the classical left-to-right axis and
a crossed one going from Spanish centralism to Catalanism (Catalan nationalism) (see
Fig. 1). Thus, in 2003 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a radical nationalist
and left-wing party, was faced to the dilemma of choosing among either a Catalanist
majority coalition with Convergència i Unió (CiU) or a left-wing majority coalition
with the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) and Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds
(ICV), which was finally formed in 2003 and has been repeated in 2006.
A classical approach to study the problem would consist in using either (a) the
Shapley value and the Owen value or, alternatively, (b) the Banzhaf value and the
Owen–Banzhaf value, in order to evaluate the strategic possibilities of each party in
both setups. The results are given in Table 1, where (NO) means no coalition for-
mation, (C) means that CiU + ERC forms, and (LW) means that PSC + ERC + ICV
forms.
According to the Shapley and Owen values used in (a), ERC would strictly prefer
joining CiU instead of PSC and ICV. The same conclusion is obtained according to
the Banzhaf and Owen–Banzhaf values used in (b). In both cases, the results fail to
provide a mathematical explanation of ERC’s actual decision (to join PSC and ICV).
Instead, by using binomial semivalues, and symmetric coalitional binomial semi-
values whenever a coalition structure exists, the conclusion of the theoretical analysis
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Catalanism
centralism
Fig. 1 Political positions in the Catalonia Parliament 2003–2007
Table 1 Classical measures of power in the Catalonia Parliament 2003–2007
(a) (b)
(NO) (C) (LW) (NO) (C) (LW)
CiU 0.4000 0.5000 0.0000 0.6250 0.5000 0.0000
PSC 0.2333 0.0000 0.3889 0.3750 0.0000 0.3750
ERC 0.2333 0.5000 0.3889 0.3750 0.5000 0.3750
PPC 0.0667 0.0000 0.0000 0.1250 0.0000 0.0000
ICV 0.0667 0.0000 0.2222 0.1250 0.0000 0.1250
is that ERC, the crucial agent in this scenario, was not necessarily forced to partici-
pate in the left-wing tripartite government but would have got more political power
in joining CiU depending on the tendency of the parties. The reader is referred to
Example 5.3 for a detailed analysis.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, a minimum of preliminaries is
provided. Section 3 is devoted to define and study the symmetric coalitional binomial
semivalue, and it includes an axiomatic characterization that parallels (Owen 1977)
for the Owen value. In Sect. 4 we present a computation procedure for the symmetric
coalitional binomial semivalue. Section 5 contains a remark on simple games and two
detailed examples and, finally, we have included in Sect. 6 a historical note.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Games and Semivalues
Let N be a finite set of players and 2N be the set of its coalitions (subsets of N ). A
cooperative game on N is a function v : 2N → R, that assigns a real number v(S)
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to each coalition S ⊆ N , with v(∅) = 0. A game v is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T )
whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N . A player i ∈ N is a dummy in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i})
for all S ⊆ N\{i}, and null in v if, moreover, v({i}) = 0. Two players i, j ∈ N are
symmetric in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ { j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
Endowed with the natural operations for real-valued functions, i.e. v + v′ and λv
for all λ ∈ R, the set of all cooperative games on N is a vector space GN . For every
nonempty coalition T ⊆ N , the unanimity game uT is defined by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S
and uT (S) = 0 otherwise, and it is easily checked that the set of all unanimity games
is a basis for GN . Finally, every permutation θ of N induces a linear automorphism of
GN given by (θv)(S) = v(θ−1S) for all S ⊆ N and all v.
By a value on GN we will mean a map f : GN → RN , that assigns to every game
v a vector f [v] with components fi [v] for all i ∈ N .
Following Weber’s (1988) axiomatic description,  : GN → RN is a semivalue iff
it satisfies the following properties:
(i) linearity: [v + v′] = [v] + [v′] (additivity) and [λv] = λ[v] for all
v, v′ ∈ GN and λ ∈ R;
(ii) anonymity: θ i [θv] = i [v] for all θ on N , i ∈ N , and v ∈ GN ;
(iii) positivity: if v is monotonic, then [v] ≥ 0;
(iv) dummy player property: if i ∈ N is a dummy in game v, then i [v] = v({i}).
There is an interesting characterization of semivalues, by means of weighting coef-
ficients, due to Dubey et al. (1981). Set n = |N |. Then: (a) for every weighting vector
{pk}n−1k=0 such that
∑n−1
k=0 pk
(
n − 1
k
)
= 1 and pk ≥ 0 for all k, the expression
i [v] =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN ,
where s = |S|, defines a semivalue ; (b) conversely, every semivalue can be obtained
in this way; (c) the correspondence given by {pk}n−1k=0 
→  is bijective.
Thus, the payoff that a semivalue allocates to every player in any game is a weighted
sum of his marginal contributions in the game. If pk is interpreted as the probability
that a given player i joins a coalition of size k, provided that all the coalitions of a
common size have the same probability of being joined, then i [v] is the expected
marginal contribution of that player to a random coalition he joins.
Well known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value ϕ (Shapley 1953),
for which pk = 1/n
(
n − 1
k
)
, and the Banzhaf value β (Owen 1975), for which
pk = 21−n . The Shapley value ϕ is the only efficient semivalue, in the sense
that
∑
i∈N ϕi [v] = v(N ) for every v ∈ GN .
Notice that these values are defined for each N . The same happens with the bino-
mial semivalues, introduced by Puente (2000) as follows. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and pk =
pk(1−p)n−k−1 for k = 0, 1, . . . , n−1. Then {pk}n−1k=0 is a weighting vector and defines
a semivalue that will be denoted as  p and called the p-binomial semivalue. Using the
convention that 00 = 1, the definition makes sense also for p = 0 and p = 1, where
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we respectively get the dictatorial index 0 and the marginal index 1, introduced
by Owen (1978) and such that 0i [v] = v({i}) and 1i [v] = v(N ) − v(N\{i}) for all
i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN . Of course, p = 1/2 gives 1/2 = β—the Banzhaf value.
In fact, semivalues are defined on cardinalities rather than on specific player sets:
this means that a weighting vector {pk}n−1k=0 defines a semivalue  on all N such that
n = |N |. When necessary, we shall write (n) for a semivalue on cardinality n and
p(n)k for its weighting coefficients. A semivalue 
(n) induces semivalues (t) for all
cardinalities t < n, recurrently defined by the Pascal triangle (inverse) formula given
by Dragan (1997):
p(t)k = p(t+1)k + p(t+1)k+1 for 0 ≤ k < t.
A series  = {(n)}∞n=1 of semivalues, one for each cardinality, is a multisemivalue
if it satisfies Dragan’s recurrence formula. Thus, the Shapley and Banzhaf values and
all binomial semivalues are multisemivalues.
2.2 Games with Coalition Structure
Let us consider a finite set, say, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We will denote by P(N ) the set
of all partitions of N . Each P ∈ P(N ) is called a coalition structure or system of
unions on N . The so-called trivial coalition structures are Pn = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}}
(individual coalitions) and P N = {N } (grand coalition). A cooperative game with a
coalition structure is a pair [v; P], where v ∈ GN and P ∈ P(N ) for a given N . Each
partition P gives a pattern of cooperation among players. We denote by GcsN the set of
all cooperative games with a coalition structure and player set N .
If [v; P] ∈ GcsN and P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}, the quotient game vP is the cooper-
ative game played by the unions, or, rather, by the set M = {1, 2, . . . , m} of their
representatives, as follows:
vP (R) = v
(
⋃
r∈R
Pr
)
for all R ⊆ M.
Unions Pr , Ps are said to be symmetric in [v; P] if r, s are symmetric players in
vP .
By a coalitional value on GcsN we will mean a map g : GcsN → RN , which assigns
to every pair [v; P] a vector g[v; P] with components gi [v; P] for each i ∈ N .
The Owen value (Owen 1977) is the coalitional value  defined by
i [v; P]=
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
1
mpk
1
(
m − 1
r
)
1
(
pk − 1
t
) [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )]
for all i ∈ N and [v; P] ∈ GcsN , where Pk ∈ P is the union such that i ∈ Pk
and Q = ⋃r∈R Pr . It was axiomatically characterized by Owen (1977) as the only
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coalitional value that satisfies the following properties: the natural extensions to this
framework of
• efficiency
• additivity
• the dummy player property
and also
• symmetry within unions: if i, j ∈ Pk are symmetric in v then
i [v; P] =  j [v; P]
• symmetry in the quotient game: if Pr , Ps ∈ P are symmetric in [v; P] then
∑
i∈Pr
i [v; P] =
∑
j∈Ps
 j [v; P].
The Owen value is a coalitional value of the Shapley value ϕ in the sense that
[v; Pn] = ϕ[v] for all v ∈ GN . Besides, [v; P N ] = ϕ[v]. Finally, as  is
defined for any N , the following property makes sense and is also satisfied:
• quotient game property: for all [v; P] ∈ GcsN ,
∑
i∈Pk
i [v; P] = k[vP ; Pm] for all Pk ∈ P.
The Owen value can be viewed as a two-step allocation rule. First, each union Pk
receives its payoff in the quotient game according to the Shapley value; then, each Pk
splits this amount among its players by applying the Shapley value to a game played
in Pk as follows: the worth of each subcoalition T of Pk is the Shapley value that T
would get in a “pseudoquotient game” played by T and the remaining unions on the
assumption that Pk\T leaves the game, i.e. the quotient game after replacing Pk with
T . This is the way to bargain within the union: each subcoalition T claims the payoff
it would obtain when dealing with the other unions in absence of its partners in Pk .
The Owen–Banzhaf value B (Owen 1982) follows a similar scheme. The result-
ing formula parallels that of the Owen value with the sole change of coefficient
1/mpk
(
m − 1
r
)(
pk − 1
t
)
by 21−m21−pk . This value, which is a coalitional value
of the Banzhaf value β, does not satisfy efficiency, but neither symmetry in the quo-
tient game nor the quotient game property. The bargaining interpretation is the same
as in the case of the Owen value by replacing everywhere the Shapley value with the
Banzhaf value.
Alonso and Fiestras (2002) introduced a modification of the Owen–Banzhaf
value. In this case, the coefficient of each marginal contribution is replaced with
21−m/pk
(
pk − 1
t
)
. This symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value  satisfies the same
properties as the Owen value, with the sole exception of efficiency—replaced by a
total power property—, as well as the quotient game property, and it is a coalitional
value of the Banzhaf value.
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Example 2.1 (Alonso and Fiestras 2002) Let us take n = 5 and consider the una-
nimity game uN and the coalition structure P = {P1, P2} where P1 = {1, 2, 3} and
P2 = {4, 5}. Notice that the quotient game is u PN = uM , where M = {1, 2}. It is not
difficult to obtain the following values:
β[uN ] = (1/16, 1/16, 1/16, 1/16, 1/16),
β[u PN ] = (1/2, 1/2),
B[uN ; P] = (1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/4, 1/4).
As P1 and P2 are symmetric in [uN ; P], it follows that the Owen–Banzhaf value B
fails to satisfy the property of symmetry in the quotient game. Neither the quotient
game property is fulfilled by B in this instance. Instead
[uN ; P] = (1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/4, 1/4)
so that both properties are satisfied by the Alonso–Fiestras value  (here and else-
where).
Since the Banzhaf value β is a particular p-binomial semivalue (p = 1/2), this
example also shows that the coalitional p-binomial semivalues, which can be obtained
from the work by Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2004) or Amer and Giménez (2003) by
applying Owen’s scheme to any p-binomial semivalue, satisfy, in general, none of
both properties. That’s why we will generalize Alonso and Fiestras’ procedure.
3 The Symmetric Coalitional Binomial Semivalue
In this section we define and study a “coalitional version” of each p-binomial semi-
value for games with coalition structure. This includes, besides the explicit formula,
an axiomatic characterization and an interpretation in terms of a two-step bargaining
process, among unions, first, and among players within each union later. We begin by
dealing with binomial semivalues. We recall that  p denotes, for each p ∈ [0, 1], the
p-binomial semivalue acting on a fixed GN .
Definition 3.1 Let p ∈ [0, 1]. A value f on GN satisfies the p-binomial total power
property if
∑
i∈N
fi [v] =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps(1 − p)n−s−1[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] for all v ∈ GN .
Lemma 3.2 Let ∅ = S ⊆ N , s = |S| and i ∈ N. Then  pi [uS] = ps−1 if i ∈ S, and

p
i [uS] = 0 otherwise.
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Proof Let i ∈ S. By the definition of the weighting coefficients of  p we have

p
i [uS] =
(
n − s
0
)
ps−1(1 − p)n−s +
(
n − s
1
)
ps(1 − p)n−s−1
+ · · · +
(
n − s
n − s
)
pn−1
= ps−1[(p + (1 − p)]n−s = ps−1.
If i /∈ S, the dummy player property yields  pi [uS] = 0. unionsq
Proposition 3.3 The unique semivalue on GN that satisfies the p-binomial total power
property is the p-binomial semivalue  p.
In other words,
∑
i∈N i [v] =
∑
i∈N 
p
i [v] for all v ∈ GN implies  =  p.
Proof (a) It is obvious that the p-binomial semivalue  p satisfies the p-binomial
total power property.
(b) Using linearity and the fact that the unanimity games form a basis of GN , it
suffices to prove that any semivalue  satisfying the p-binomial total power
property coincides with  p on each unanimity game. Let uS be such a game
for some S ⊆ N . From the dummy player property we get i [uS] = 0 =

p
i [uS] for all i /∈ S. From the p-binomial total power property it follows that∑
i∈S i [uS] = sps−1. Using anonymity, i [uS] = ps−1 for each i ∈ S, and
this allocation coincides with  pi [uS] according to Lemma 3.2. unionsq
In particular, setting p = 1/2 we obtain that the Banzhaf value β is the only semi-
value that satisfies the classical total power property:
∑
i∈N
fi [v] = 12n−1
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\{i}
[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] for all v ∈ GN .
The Owen (resp., Owen–Banzhaf) value is a natural extension of the Shapley (resp.,
Banzhaf) value to games with a coalition structure. We generalize this idea.
Definition 3.4 Given a value f on GN , a coalitional value of f is a coalitional value
g on GcsN such that g[v; Pn] = f [v] for all v ∈ GN .
Let g be a coalitional value of the p-binomial semivalue  p defined for all N ,
and assume that g satisfies the quotient game property. Then, for a given N and any
[v; P] ∈ GcsN ,
∑
i∈N
gi [v; P] =
∑
k∈M
∑
i∈Pk
gi [v; P] =
∑
k∈M
gk[vP ; Pm] =
∑
k∈M

p
k [vP ]
=
∑
k∈M
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1[vP (R ∪ {k}) − vP (R)].
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This motivates the next definition, that is an adaptation of the p-binomial total power
property to games with a coalition structure.
Definition 3.5 Let p ∈ [0, 1]. A coalitional value g on GcsN satisfies the coalitional
p-binomial total power property if, for all [v; P] ∈ GcsN ,
∑
i∈N
gi [v; P] =
∑
k∈M
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1[vP (R ∪ {k}) − vP (R)].
The next statement defines and axiomatically characterizes, for each p ∈ [0, 1],
the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue, which will be denoted as p.
Theorem 3.6 Let p ∈ [0, 1]. For any N there is a unique coalitional value on GcsN
that satisfies additivity, the dummy player property, symmetry within unions, symme-
try in the quotient game, and the coalitional p-binomial total power property. Given
[v; P] ∈ GcsN , this value allocates to each player i ∈ N the real number

p
i [v; P] =
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1 1
pk
(
pk − 1
t
) [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )],
where Pk ∈ P is the union such that i ∈ Pk and Q = ⋃
r∈R
Pr .
Moreover, p is a coalitional value of the p-binomial semivalue  p and satisfies
the quotient game property.
Proof (a) (Existence) It suffices to show that the coalitional value p given by the
above formula satisfies the five properties enumerated in the statement.
1. Additivity. It merely follows from the expression of pi [v; P].
2. Dummy player property. Let i ∈ N be a dummy player in game v and P be
any coalition structure. Assume i ∈ Pk . Then v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i})− v(Q ∪ T ) =
v({i}) for all R and T . As, moreover,
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1 = 1 and
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
1
pk
(
pk − 1
t
) = 1,
we conclude that pi [v; P] = v({i}).
3. Symmetry within unions. Let i, j ∈ Pk ∈ P be symmetric players in game
v. For each R ⊆ M\{k} and T ⊆ Pk\{i, j}, let 	(R, T, h) = v(Q ∪ T ∪
{h}) − v(Q ∪ T ) for h = i, j . Then, by the symmetric position of i, j in v,
f (R, T ) = 	(R, T, i) − 	(R, T, j) = 0 and
g(R, T ) = 	(R, T ∪ { j}, i) − 	(R, T ∪ {i}, j) = 0,
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so that

p
i [v; P] − pj [v; P] =
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1
∑
T⊆Pk\{i, j}
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
f (R, T )
pk
(
pk − 1
t
) + g(R, T )
pk
(
pk − 1
t + 1
)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ = 0.
4. Coalitional p-binomial total power property. Let [v; P] ∈ GcsN . Fixing k ∈ M ,
for every R ⊆ M\{k} we consider the game vR ∈ GPk defined by
vR(T ) = v(Q ∪ T ) − v(Q) for all T ⊆ Pk .
The Shapley value gives, for each i ∈ Pk ,
ϕi [vR] =
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
1
pk
(
pk − 1
t
) [v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )].
Using the efficiency of ϕ, we get
∑
i∈Pk
ϕi [vR] = vR(Pk) = v(Q ∪ Pk) − v(Q) = vP (R ∪ {k}) − vP (R).
Hence
∑
i∈Pk

p
i [v; P] =
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1[vP (R ∪ {k}) − vP (R)]
= ( p)(m)k [vP ]
and, finally,
∑
i∈N

p
i [v; P] =
∑
k∈M
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1[vP (R ∪ {k}) − vP (R)].
5. Symmetry in the quotient game. It readily follows from the relationship
∑
i∈Pk

p
i [v; P] = ( p)(m)k [vP ],
stated in the previous point, and the anonymity (whence symmetry) of the
p-binomial semivalue  p.
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(b) (Uniqueness) Let g be a coalitional value on GcsN satisfying the five properties.
Using additivity and the fact that the unanimity games form a basis of GN , it
suffices to show that g is completely determined by its action on any pair of the
form [λuS; P], where λ ∈ R,∅ = S ⊆ N and P ∈ P(N ).
By the dummy player property, gi [λuS; P] = 0 if i /∈ S. This leaves us with
players i ∈ S.
Let S′ = {k ∈ M : S ∩ Pk = ∅} and, for every k ∈ S′, S′k = S ∩ Pk . It is easy to
see that (λuS)P = λuS′ . From the coalitional p-binomial total power property,
and applying Lemma 3.2, we have
∑
i∈N
gi [λuS; P] =
∑
k∈M
( p)
(m)
k [λuS′ ] =
∑
k∈S′
( p)
(m)
k [λuS′ ] = λs′ ps
′−1.
Now, from symmetry in the quotient game, if k ∈ S′ then
∑
i∈S′k
gi [λuS; P] =
∑
i∈Pk
gi [λuS; P] = λps′−1
and, finally, using symmetry within unions,
gi [λuS; P] = λp
s′−1
s′k
for any i ∈ S′k .
As S = ⋃k∈S′ S′k , this concludes the proof that g is univocally determined.
(c) p is a coalitional value of the p-binomial semivalue  p. Indeed, for P = Pn
the explicit formula of p reduces to

p
i [v; Pn] =
∑
R⊆N\{i}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1[v(R ∪ {i}) − v(R)] =  pi [v].
Finally, the quotient game property: as we have seen when showing the symmetry
in the quotient game in part (a) of this proof, and using the preceding property
for GcsM , ∑
i∈Pk

p
i [v; P] = ( p)(m)k [vP ] = pk [vP ; Pm]. unionsq
Remark 3.7 (a) The symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue is a natural (and
wide) generalization of Alonso and Fiestras’ symmetric coalitional Banzhaf
value, since 1/2 = .
(b) p relates not only to the p-binomial semivalue  p (of which it is a coalitional
value) but also to the Shapley value ϕ, as
p[v; P N ] = ϕ[v] for any v ∈ GN .
Thus, in some manner, p establishes a “coalitional path” that links ϕ and  p.
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(c) From Theorem 3.6 it follows that the only axiomatic difference between the
Owen value  and the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue p is that
the former satisfies efficiency whereas the latter satisfies the coalitional p-bino-
mial total power property, in a way that parallels the distinction between the
Shapley value ϕ and the p-binomial semivalue  p.
(d) It is worth mentioning that in the parallel axiomatizations of the Owen value and
the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue, additivity might be replaced
with linearity, and the dummy player property with the null player property.
We have chosen the first possibility in each case (additivity and dummy player
property).
(e) The symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue also merges the Shapley value
and the p-binomial semivalue. It is the result of a two-step bargaining proce-
dure similar to that of the Owen value. In our case, the unions play the quotient
game among themselves and each one receives the payoff given by the p-bino-
mial semivalue  p, and then this payoff is efficiently shared within the union
according to the Shapley value ϕ.
4 A Computation Procedure
The multilinear extension (Owen 1972) of a game v ∈ GN is the real-valued function
defined on RN by
f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
∑
S⊆N
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j /∈S
(1 − x j )v(S).
As is well known, both the Shapley and Banzhaf values of any game v can be easily
obtained from its multilinear extension. Indeed, ϕ[v] can be calculated by integrat-
ing the partial derivatives of the multilinear extension of the game along the main
diagonal x1 = x2 = · · · = xn of the cube [0, 1]N (Owen 1972), while the partial
derivatives of that multilinear extension evaluated at point (1/2, 1/2, . . . , 1/2) give
β[v] (Owen 1975). This latter procedure extends well to any p-binomial semivalue
(see Puente 2000; Freixas and Puente 2002 or Amer and Giménez 2003) by evaluating
the derivatives at point (p, p, . . . , p).
In the context of games with a coalition structure, the multilinear extension tech-
nique has been also applied to computing the Owen value  (Owen and Winter 1992),
as well as the Owen–Banzhaf value B (Carreras and Magaña 1994) and the sym-
metric coalitional Banzhaf value  (Alonso et al. 2005). In this section we present a
method to compute the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue p by means of
the multilinear extension of the game.
Theorem 4.1 Let p ∈ [0, 1] and [v; P] ∈ GcsN be a cooperative game with a coali-
tion structure. Then the following steps lead to the symmetric coalitional p-binomial
semivalue of any player i ∈ Pk in [v; P].
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1. Obtain the multilinear extension f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of game v.
2. For every r = k and all h ∈ Pr , replace the variable xh with yr . This yields a new
function of x j for j ∈ Pk and yr for r ∈ M\{k}.
3. In this function, reduce to 1 all higher exponents, i.e. replace with yr each
yqr such that q > 1. This gives a new multilinear function that we denote as
g((x j ) j∈Pk , (yr )r∈M\{k}).
4. In the function obtained in step 3, substitute each yr by p. This provides a new
function αk((x j ) j∈Pk ) defined by
αk((x j ) j∈Pk ) = g((x j ) j∈Pk , (p)r∈M\{k}).
5. Finally, the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue of player i ∈ Pk in [v; P]
is given by

p
i [v; P] =
1∫
0
∂αk
∂xi
(z, z, . . . , z)dz.
Proof Steps 1–3 have already been used by Owen and Winter (1992), Carreras and
Magaña (1994) and Alonso et al. (2005) in dealing with the Owen value, the Owen–
Banzhaf value and the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value, respectively. It will be
useful to recall their common argument here.
By the second and third steps, we get a multilinear function where all terms corre-
sponding to coalitions S such that S∩Pr = ∅ and (N\S)∩Pr = ∅ for some r ∈ M\{k}
vanish. Indeed, in step 2, the terms corresponding to these coalitions include expres-
sions like cyq1r (1− yr )q2 , with q1, q2 ∈ N, and in step 3 these terms turn on c(yr − yr )
thus getting zero.
Hence, the only coalitions S for which the corresponding term of the (initial) mul-
tilinear extension may not vanish after steps 2 and 3 are those of the form S = Q ∪ T ,
where T ⊆ Pk and Q = ⋃
r∈R
Pr for some R ⊆ M\{k}. The function arising from step
3 is therefore
g((x j ) j∈Pk , (yr )r∈M\{k})
=
∑
T⊆Pk
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∏
j∈T
x j
∏
j∈Pk\T
(1 − x j )
∏
r∈R
yr
∏
r /∈R∪{k}
(1 − yr )v(Q ∪ T ).
Substituting each yr by p (step 4) gives
αk((x j ) j∈Pk ) =
∑
T⊆Pk
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∏
j∈T
x j
∏
j∈Pk\T
(1 − x j )pr (1 − p)m−r−1v(Q ∪ T ).
By differentiating function αk((x j ) j∈Pk ) with respect to xi
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∂αk
∂xi
((x j ) j∈Pk ) =
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∏
j∈T
x j
∏
j∈Pk\(T∪{i})
(1 − x j )pr (1 − p)m−r−1
[v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )].
Finally, by step 5,
1∫
0
∂αk
∂xi
(z, z, . . . , z)dz =
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1
[v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )]
1∫
0
zt (1 − z)pk−t−1dz =
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr (1 − p)m−r−1 t !(pk − t − 1)!
pk !
×[v(Q ∪ T ∪ {i}) − v(Q ∪ T )]
= pi [v; P]. unionsq
5 A Remark and Two Examples
Simple games form an especially interesting class of cooperative games. Not only as
a test bed for many cooperative concepts, but also for the variety of their interpreta-
tions, often far from game theory. In particular, they are frequently applied to describe
and analyze collective decision-making mechanisms—weighted majority games play
a crucial role here—, and the notion of voting power is closely attached to them.
Shapley and Shubik (1954) were the first to adapt a cooperative tool—the Shapley
value—to simple games, using it as a measure of power. Shapley (1962) stated a series
of arguments inviting to a self-contained treatment of this class of games, and Dubey
(1975) initiated this line when providing an axiomatic characterization of the Shap-
ley–Shubik power index as a solution concept on the class of simple games, for which
he introduced the transfer property in order to replace the useless additivity property.
A cooperative game v on N is simple if it is monotonic and v(S) = 0 or 1 for
every S ⊆ N . A coalition S ⊆ N is winning in v if v(S) = 1 (otherwise it is called
losing), and W (v) denotes the set of winning coalitions in v. Due to monotonicity,
the set W m(v) of all minimal winning coalitions determines W (v) and hence the
game. A simple game v is a weighted majority game if there are nonnegative weights
w1, w2, . . . , wn allocated to the players and a positive quota q such that
v(S) = 1 iff
∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q.
We then write v = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn]. (For additional details on simple games, we
refer the interested reader to e.g. Carreras and Freixas 1996, Taylor and Zwicker 1999
or Carreras 2001.)
LetSGN denote the set of all simple games on a given player set N . A power index on
SGN is a function f : SGN → RN . All properties stated for values in this paper—with
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the sole exception of additivity and linearity—make sense for power indices. AsSGN is
a lattice under the standard composition laws given by (v∨v′)(S) = max{v(S), v′(S)}
and (v ∧ v′)(S) = min{v(S), v′(S)}, we will say that a power index f satisfies the
transfer property if
f [v ∨ v′] = f [v] + f [v′] − f [v ∧ v′] for all v, v′ ∈ SGN .
Carreras et al. (2003) gave an axiomatic characterization and a combinatorial descrip-
tion in terms of weighting coefficients for (the restrictions of) semivalues as power
indices, which parallel the corresponding ones for semivalues on general cooperative
games.
Let SGcsN be the set of all simple games with a coalition structure on N . A coali-
tional power index on SGcsN is a function g : SGcsN → RN . All properties stated for
coalitional values in this paper—excluding again additivity and linearity—, as well as
the natural extension of the transfer property, make sense for coalitional power indi-
ces. Vázquez et al. (1997) carried out an axiomatic characterization of the (restricted)
Owen value as a coalitional power index by means of efficiency, the transfer property,
the dummy player property, symmetry within unions and symmetry in the quotient
game.
In a similar way, we have found a “parallel” axiomatic characterization of the sym-
metric coalitional binomial semivalues as power indices (that is, restricted to SGcsN )
that we state without proof because it is very similar to that of Theorem 3.6.
Corollary 5.1 Let p ∈ [0, 1]. For any N there is a unique coalitional power index
on SGcsN that satisfies the coalitional p-binomial total power property, the transfer
property, the dummy player property, symmetry within unions and symmetry in the
quotient game. It is the restriction of the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue
P to SGcsN .
Besides, this index satisfies the quotient game property and reduces to the
(restricted) p-binomial semivalue  p when P = Pn and to the Shapley–Shubik
power index ϕ when P = P N . unionsq
Example 5.2 Let us consider the 5-person weighted majority game
v = [68; 46, 42, 23, 15, 9]
and the coalition structure P = {{1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3}}. We will compute  p[v] and
p[v; P] for any p ∈ [0, 1].
The set of minimal winning coalitions of the game is
W m(v) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}}
and the multilinear extension of v is
f (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = x1x2 + x1x3 − x1x2x3 + x1x4x5 + x2x3x4 + x2x3x5
− x1x2x3x4 − x1x2x3x5 − x1x2x4x5
− x1x3x4x5 − x2x3x4x5 + 2x1x2x3x4x5.
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Taking into account that players 2 and 3, on one hand, and players 4 and 5 on the
other, are symmetric in v, the computation method for binomial semivalues stated by
Puente (2000) (see also Amer and Giménez 2003) gives

p
1 [v] =
∂ f
∂x1
(p, p, p, p, p) = p(1 − p)(2 + 2p − 2p2),

p
3 [v] =  p2 [v] =
∂ f
∂x2
(p, p, p, p, p) = p(1 − p)(1 + 2p − 2p2),

p
5 [v] =  p4 [v] =
∂ f
∂x4
(p, p, p, p, p) = p(1 − p)(2p − 2p2).
In order to compute p[v] we use Theorem 4.1. As M = {1, 2, 3}, steps 1–3 give
g1(x1, x4, y2, y3) = y2 y3 + x1(y2 + y3 − 2y2 y3),
g2(y1, x2, x5, y3) = y1 y3 + x2(y1 − y1 y3) + x5(y1 − y1 y3) + x2x5(y3 − y1),
g3(y1, y2, x3) = y1 y2 + x3(y1 + y2 − 2y1 y2),
and step 4 leads to
α1(x1, x4) = g1(x1, x4, p, p) = p2 + x1(2p − 2p2),
α2(x2, x5) = g2(p, x2, x5, p) = p2 + x2(p − p2) + x5(p − p2),
α3(x3) = g3(p, p, x3) = p2 + x3(2p − 2p2).
Step 5 concludes the procedure and gives

p
1 [v; P] =
1∫
0
∂α1
∂x1
(z, z)dz = 2p − 2p2, p4 [v; P] =
1∫
0
∂α1
∂x4
(z, z)dz = 0,

p
2 [v; P] =
1∫
0
∂α2
∂x2
(z, z)dz = p − p2, p5 [v; P] =
1∫
0
∂α2
∂x5
(z, z)dz = p − p2,

p
3 [v; P] =
1∫
0
∂α3
∂x3
(z)dz = 2p − 2p2.
Thus
p[v; P] = (2p − 2p2, p − p2, 2p − 2p2, 0, p − p2).
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Table 2 Weighting coefficients of some p-binomial semivalues  p for n = 5
p=0.1 p=0.4 p = 0.5 (Banzhaf) p=0.8
p0 = (1 − p)4 0.6561 0.1296 0.0625 0.0016
p1 = p(1 − p)3 0.0729 0.0864 0.0625 0.0064
p2 = p2(1 − p)2 0.0081 0.0576 0.0625 0.0256
p3 = p3(1 − p) 0.0009 0.0384 0.0625 0.1024
p4 = p4 0.0001 0.0256 0.0625 0.4096
In the following example, we shall apply some values and coalitional values (mainly
 p and p) to the analysis of an interesting political structure: the Catalonia Parlia-
ment 2003–2007. All values have been computed using the multilinear extension
technique, as illustrated in the preceding example.
In the papers by Straffin (1988), Laruelle (1999) and Laruelle and Valenciano
(2001), the Banzhaf value β is suggested as a power measure more suitable than the
Shapley value. The natural generalization to semivalues has been argued by Laruelle
and Valenciano (2001), Carreras and Freixas (2002), and Carreras et al. (2003). By
considering here binomial semivalues, we look at the Banzhaf value in perspective,
as will be shown by the results of our analysis.
Therefore, our study of alliances will be based on the bargaining process corre-
sponding to the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues p: first, a power notion
is shared among unions in the quotient game by means of the Banzhaf value or a bino-
mial semivalue; then, the power so got by each union is shared among its members by
using the Shapley value. This will reflect that both bargaining steps are of different
nature. Indeed, notice that, once an alliance is formed—and, especially, if it supports a
coalition government—, cabinet ministries, parliamentary and institutional positions,
budgets, and other political responsibilities have to be distributed efficiently among
the parties of the coalition, hence in a way as closely as possible to the one suggested
by the Shapley value. At this point, the quotient game property and symmetry in the
quotient game become very relevant properties. In fact, they are connected because if
a coalitional value satisfies the quotient game property (as is the case for all p) and it
is a coalitional value of the Banzhaf value (or a p-binomial semivalue) then symmetry
in the quotient game follows from the anonymity of β (or of  p).
Which is the reason for letting p range from 0 to 1? Notice that a reasonable regu-
larity assumption on players’ behavior is that the probability to form coalitions follows
a monotonic (increasing or decreasing) behavior. Then, it is not difficult to see that
the only semivalues such that pk+1 = λpk for all k (maybe the simplest form of
monotonicity) are precisely the p-binomial semivalues, in which case λ = p1−p for
any p ∈ [0, 1]. For example, p = 0.1 means that the players are very reticent to form
coalitions, whereas p = 0.8 means that great coalitions are likelier. The neutral case
p = 0.5 corresponds to the Banzhaf value. Table 2 shows, for n = 5, the weighting
coefficients of  p for several values of p.
As we will see, almost all allocations  pi [v] and coalitional allocations pi [v; P]
will show factors p(1 − p); the sole exceptions are the cases where i is a dictator or
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Table 3 Initial power distribution in the Catalonia Parliament 2003–2007

p
i [v] p = 0.1 p = 0.4 p = 0.5 p = 0.8
1. CiU p(1 − p)(2 + 2p − 2p2) 0.1962 0.5952 0.6250 0.3712
2. PSC p(1 − p)(1 + 2p − 2p2) 0.1062 0.3552 0.3750 0.2112
3. ERC p(1 − p)(1 + 2p − 2p2) 0.1062 0.3552 0.3750 0.2112
4. PPC p(1 − p)(2p − 2p2) 0.0162 0.1152 0.1250 0.0512
5. ICV p(1 − p)(2p − 2p2) 0.0162 0.1152 0.1250 0.0512
τ p[v] p(1 − p)(4 + 10p − 10p2) 0.4410 1.5360 1.6250 0.8960
veto player (if we were dealing with improper games, we should add winner players
to this short list). Furthermore, the maximum or the minimum of all these allocations
for each player will be attained in case p = 0.5, that respectively correspond to the
Banzhaf value β = 1/2 or to the Alonso–Fiestras coalitional value  = 1/2. These
properties would not have been discovered if only the case p = 0.5 were considered.
Example 5.3 (The Catalonia Parliament, Legislature 2003–2007) Five parties elected
members to the Catalonia Parliament (135 seats) in the elections held on November
16, 2003, giving rise to a seat distribution that can be represented by the weighted
majority game
v = [68; 46, 42, 23, 15, 9].
Let us briefly describe ideologically the agents in this game:
1: CiU (Convergència i Unió), Catalan nationalist middle-of-the-road coalition of
two federated parties.
2: PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya), moderate left-wing socialist party, fed-
erated to the Partido Socialista Obrero Español.
3: ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), radical Catalan nationalist left-wing
party.
4: PPC (Partit Popular de Catalunya), conservative party, Catalan delegation of the
Partido Popular.
5: ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds), coalition of Catalan eurocommunist parties,
federated to Izquierda Unida, and ecologist groups (“Verds”).
Notice that, as pointed out in Example 5.2,
W m(v) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}},
so that players 2 and 3 on one hand, and 4 and 5 on the other, are symmetric in v.
We show in Table 3 the evaluation of v given by several binomial semivalues  p.
The total power is τ p[v] = ∑i∈N  pi [v].
It is easy to see that the allocations found for p and 1 − p would coincide because
the game is decisive (proper and strong). Notice that the proportions between the
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allocations to the players decrease as p approaches 0.5 from any of the extreme pos-
sibilities (0 or 1). Also notice that the maximum allocation (power) for any player and
the maximum total power are got for p = 0.5 (Banzhaf value).
Next we are interested in the study and comparison of several coalition structures. In
each case, we have computed the coalitional value p for all p ∈ [0, 1] and also  (for
p = 1/2) and the coalitional p-binomial total power T p[v; P] = ∑i∈N pi [v; P].
The cases and results are as follows:
• The left-wing alliance PSC+ICV, as a previous step. The corresponding coalition
structure is P = {{2, 5}, {1}, {3}, {4}}, and the coalitional values are:
[v; P] = (1/2, 3/8, 1/2, 0, 1/8),
p[v; P] = (2p − 2p2, 1.5p − 1.5p2, 2p − 2p2, 0, 0.5p − 0.5p2),
T p[v; P] = 6p(1 − p).
• The simultaneous alliances CiU+PPC and PSC+ICV, as an alternative previous step.
The corresponding coalition structure is P = {{1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3}}, and the coalitional
values are:
[v; P] = (1/2, 1/4, 1/2, 0, 1/4),
p[v; P] = (2p − 2p2, p − p2, 2p − 2p2, 0, p − p2),
T p[v; P] = 6p(1 − p).
• The left-wing majority alliance PSC+ERC+ICV. The corresponding coalition struc-
ture is P = {{2, 3, 5}, {1}, {4}}, and the coalitional values are:
[v; P] = (0, 5/12, 5/12, 0, 2/12),
p[v; P] =
(
0,
1 + p − p2
3
,
1 + p − p2
3
, 0,
1 − 2p + 2p2
3
)
,
T p[v; P] = 1.
Notice that pi [v; P] >  pi [v] for all p ∈ [0, 1] and i = 2, 3, 5, and also that
p = 0.5 gives the maximum of p[v; P] for PSC and ERC but, at the same time,
the minimum of p[v; P] for ICV.
Incidentally, in this case B[v; P] = (0, 3/8, 3/8, 0, 1/8), so that B fails to satisfy
the quotient game property and the sharing of the dictatorial power is by no means
convincing because of its inefficiency.
• The catalanist majority alliance CiU+ERC. The corresponding coalition structure
is P = {{1, 3}, {2}, {4}, {5}}, and the coalitional values are:
[v; P] = (5/8, 0, 3/8, 0, 0),
p[v; P] =
(
1+p−p2
2 , 0,
1−p+p2
2 , 0, 0
)
,
T p[v; P] = 1.
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Table 4 Evaluation according to  p and p for p = 0.5
Scenario Value CiU PSC ERC PPC ICV
Initial (no alliance) β 0.6250 0.3750 0.3750 0.1250 0.1250
PSC+ICV B =  0.5000 0.3750 0.5000 0 0.1250
PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC B =  0.5000 0.2500 0.5000 0 0.2500
PSC+ERC+ICV B 0 0.3750 0.3750 0 0.1250
PSC+ERC+ICV  0 0.4167 0.4167 0 0.1667
CiU+ERC B =  0.6250 0 0.3750 0 0
In this case i [v; P] = βi [v] but pi [v; P] >  pi [v] for all p ∈ [0, 1] and i = 1, 3
(unless p = 0.5, where the equality holds). Here p = 0.5 gives the maximum of
p[v; P] for CiU and the minimum for ERC.
A most convenient way to analyze this set of evaluations of the coalitional behavior
will consist in considering different values of p, and we will take 0.1, 0.4, 0.5 (this
gives ) and 0.8. Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 show all these particular allocations but we prefer
the following order: p = 0.5, p = 0.4, p = 0.8 and p = 0.1.
In Table 4, we find that precoalition PSC+ICV does not increase the power of their
members, but it damages the strategic position of CiU and enhances the strategic possi-
bilities of ERC. The alternative (simultaneous precoalitions PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC)
does not make better off CiU and PPC but, instead, damages PSC, increases the power
of ICV and gives the same position to ERC. Of course, PPC loses its small power even
in joining CiU (its only natural partner in this situation) because once PSC+ICV is
formed PPC becomes a null player.
An important point arises when considering the majority formation. According to
the Owen–Banzhaf value B, forming a winning coalition does not change the power
of its members with regard to the initial distribution, although it serves to reduce the
outside parties to a null position. Instead, from the viewpoint of the symmetric coa-
litional Banzhaf value , coalition PSC+ERC+ICV clearly increases the power of
each one of its members, and hence it suggests to ERC the convenience to choose this
coalition (which also satisfies its partners, PSC and ICV) instead of CiU+ERC.
Therefore, we have to point out here that after a short period of negotiations, pre-
cisely concerning these two options, alliance PSC+ERC+ICV was actually formed
and got the regional government of Catalonia, ending 23 years of CiU governments
headed by Jordi Pujol (under absolute majority of this party or with the parliamentary
support of PPC). The actual sharing of positions gave the presidency of the government
to Pasqual Maragall (PSC) but the presidency of the Parliament and the “Conseller
en cap” position (a sort of vice-presidency of the government) to Ernest Benach and
Josep Lluis Carod Rovira (both ERC), respectively. The remaining cabinet positions
(“conselleries”) were distributed in the proportion 8:5:2 among the three parties.
We recall that the allocations on this (decisive) game for a given p are the same as
for 1 − p, so that our comments on Table 5 (p = 0.4) are the same as they would be
for p = 0.6, and the analogue holds for Tables 6 and 7.
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Table 5 Evaluation according to  p and p for p = 0.4
Scenario CiU PSC ERC PPC ICV
Initial (no alliance) 0.5952 0.3552 0.3552 0.1152 0.1152
PSC+ICV 0.4800 0.3600 0.4800 0 0.1200
PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC 0.4800 0.2400 0.4800 0 0.2400
PSC+ERC+ICV 0 0.4133 0.4133 0 0.1733
CiU+ERC 0.6200 0 0.3800 0 0
Table 6 Evaluation according to  p and p for p = 0.8
Scenario CiU PSC ERC PPC ICV
Initial (no alliance) 0.3712 0.2112 0.2112 0.0512 0.0512
PSC+ICV 0.3200 0.2400 0.3200 0 0.0800
PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC 0.3200 0.1600 0.3200 0 0.1600
PSC+ERC+ICV 0 0.3867 0.3867 0 0.2267
CiU+ERC 0.5800 0 0.4200 0 0
Table 7 Evaluation according to  p and p for p = 0.1
Scenario CiU PSC ERC PPC ICV
Initial (no alliance) 0.1962 0.1062 0.1062 0.0162 0.0162
PSC+ICV 0.1800 0.1350 0.1800 0 0.0450
PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC 0.1800 0.0900 0.1800 0 0.0900
PSC+ERC+ICV 0 0.3633 0.3633 0 0.2733
CiU+ERC 0.5450 0 0.4550 0 0
By comparing the results given in Table 4 with those of Table 5, where it is assumed
that players are not indifferent to join a coalition of any size but, rather, they prefer
not too big coalitions (as p = 0.4), we notice that forming precoalition PSC+ICV
increases a bit the power of its members. Its effects on the outside parties, as well
as those of the alternative (simultaneous formation of CiU+PPC) are the same as in
Table 4.
As to the formation of majorities, here, not only in the case of PSC+ERC+ICV but
also in the case of CiU+ERC, every party entering such a coalition clearly increases
its power. However, from ERC’s viewpoint, coalition PSC+ERC+ICV gives again the
best fraction of coalitional power.
It is worth mentioning that almost all (initial or coalitional) power allocations given
in Table 6 are lower than in the previous cases. The only exceptions are for ICV in
PSC+ERC+ICV and ERC in CiU+ERC. Nevertheless, the variations undergone by
the initial allocations when the precoalitions form are similar to those found in Table 5.
The new feature here is that, in these circumstances (p = 0.8), ERC would clearly
prefer CiU+ERC instead of PSC+ERC+ICV.
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Finally, Table 7 exhibits the same trends as Table 6 but they are even strength-
ened. Again, ERC would prefer CiU+ERC, and notice that the increase of its power
in agreeing to form this coalition would be greater than in the previous case.
It is not difficult to see that ERC would prefer option PSC+ERC+ICV instead of
CiU+ERC if, and only if, p ∈ ( 5−
√
5
10 ,
5+√5
10 ), would remain indifferent if p = 5±
√
5
10
and would prefer CiU+ERC if p /∈ [ 5−
√
5
10 ,
5+√5
10 ].
As a conclusion of our analysis, we find that the evaluation of games and games
with a coalition structure by means of binomial semivalues and symmetric coalitional
binomial semivalues provides a new approach to the study of the coalitional bargain-
ing. Some general properties sketched only on the basis of this instance should deserve
further attention. And, finally, the extension of the coalitional theory to probabilistic
values might be, in the near future, an interesting research field.
6 A Historical Note
Shapley (1953) (see also Roth 1988; Owen 1995) initiated the value theory for coop-
erative games. The Shapley value applies without restrictions and provides, for every
game, a single payoff vector to the players. The restriction of the value to simple
games gives rise to the Shapley and Shubik (1954) power index, that was axiomatized
by Dubey (1975) introducing the transfer property. As a sort of reaction, Banzhaf
(1965) proposed a different power index (see also Coleman 1971, and even Penrose
1946), that Owen (1975) extended to a dummy-independent and somehow “normal-
ized” Banzhaf value for all cooperative games. A nice almost common characteriza-
tion of the Shapley and Banzhaf values would be given by Feltkamp (1995), and a
sound interpretative and comparative analysis has been carried out by Laruelle and
Valenciano (2001). See also Owen (1978), Dubey and Shapley (1979), Lehrer (1988),
Dragan (1996) and Carreras (2005).
Dubey et al. (1981) axiomatically introduced the notion of semivalue, that encom-
passes both the Shapley and Banzhaf values (see also Weber 1979; Einy 1987). Weber
(1988) gave an alternative characterization for semivalues and introduced the proba-
bilistic values by dropping anonymity.
Many authors have been working on semivalues. We will refer only to the most
related to the present paper. Carreras and Freixas (1999) and Carreras and Freixas
(2000) introduced regular semivalues. Puente (2000) devoted much of her Ph.D. the-
sis to semivalues and introduced binomial semivalues as a natural generalization of
the Banzhaf value (see also Freixas and Freixas and Puente (2002), where different
ways are provided to evaluate the importance of the components in a given reliabil-
ity system based on semivalues and probabilistic values). Laruelle and Valenciano
(2001) and Carreras et al. (2003) investigated semivalues as power indices, that is,
by restricting them to simple games. Finally, Carreras and Freixas (2002) suggested
several applications of semivalues based on their versatility.
Games with a coalition structure were introduced by Aumann and Drèze (1974),
who extended the Shapley value to this new framework in such a manner that the
game really splits into subgames played by the unions isolatedly from each other, and
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every player receives the payoff allocated by the restriction of the Shapley value to
the subgame he is playing within his union. A second approach was used by Owen
(1977), when introducing and axiomatically characterizing his coalitional value (Owen
value). In this case, the unions play a quotient game among themselves, and each one
receives a payoff which, in turn, is shared among its players in an internal game.
Both payoffs, in the quotient game for unions and within each union for its players,
are given by applying the Shapley value. Further axiomatizations of the Owen value
have been given by e.g. Hart and Kurz (1983), Peleg (1989), Winter (1992), Amer
and Carreras (1995) and Amer and Carreras (2001), Vázquez et al. (1997), Vázquez
(1998), Hamiache (1999) and Hamiache (2001), Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2004) and
Albizuri (2002).
By applying a similar procedure to the Banzhaf value, Owen (1982) got the mod-
ified Banzhaf value or Owen–Banzhaf value for games with a coalition structure. In
this case the payoffs at both levels, that of the unions in the quotient game and that
of the players within each union, are given by the Banzhaf value. This modified value
was axiomatically characterized only recently, by Albizuri (2001) and Albizuri (2002)
and, independently, by Amer et al. (2002). Interesting interpretations of this value as
a power index when restricted to simple games can be found in Laruelle and Laruelle
and Valenciano (2003).
The natural generalization of semivalues for games with coalition structure has
been carried out by Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2004). These authors provide axiomatic
characterizations in both cases: the homogeneous one, when a common semivalue is
used by unions in the quotient game and by players within each one of them (see also
Giménez (2001) and Amer and Giménez (2003) for this case), and the heterogeneous
one, where different semivalues apply in the quotient game and (uniformly) within all
unions.
Alonso and Fiestras (2002) realized that the Owen–Banzhaf value fails to satisfy
two interesting properties of the Owen value: symmetry in the quotient game and
the quotient game property. Then they suggested to modify the two-step allocation
scheme and use the Banzhaf value for sharing in the quotient game and the Shapley
value within unions. This gave rise to a new, heterogeneous coalitional value that can
be compared with the Owen value and satisfies the above properties.
In fact, heterogeneous coalitional values are a particular case of mixed coalition-
al values. Mixed coalitional values were already suggested by Carreras and Magaña
(1997) in a more general setup (see also Alonso et al. 2005). The idea is that unions
might use any value in the quotient game and, then, the players of each union might
use a value different from that of the unions and from those used within other unions.
Notice that the unions are, in general, of a different nature from the original, single
players, and even from each other, and the quotient game may well possess features
not found in the initial game. The question is not, therefore, “why will the unions
follow, as entities, a way different from players’ one?” but, rather, “why not?” After
all, freedom is a human aspiration that we should take into account in our mathemat-
ical modeling of the real life behavior, and the contract for forming each union could
(in fact, it should) perfectly specify the way to share profits among its members.
Then, a formal notation will help us to better distinguish the several coalitional eval-
uation criteria that can arise. Let σ be the semivalue used by unions and ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρm
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be the semivalues respectively used by each union. We denote the compound rule as
σρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρm .
With this notation, a first level of homogeneity is achieved in case σρ, ρ, . . . , ρ = σρm
for some common ρ. Thus, Alonso and Fiestras (2002) symmetric coalitional Banzhaf
value is  = βϕm , whereas the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalue introduced
in this paper is p =  pϕm , where  p is the binomial semivalue defined by number
p. A further homogeneity level is finally found in the case where σ = ρ, like in
Owen’s classical extensions: the Owen value is  = ϕϕm and the Owen–Banzhaf
value is B = β βm .
Great attention has also been paid to the computation of values, usually in terms
of the multilinear extension (Owen 1972) of the original game. Thus, Owen (1972)
refers to the Shapley value ϕ, Owen (1975) to the Banzhaf value β, and Owen and
Winter (1992) to the Owen value . Carreras and Magaña (1994) have applied the
same procedure to the Owen–Banzhaf value B, and Carreras and Magaña (1997) have
studied the multilinear extension of the quotient game.
More recently, Alonso et al. (2005) apply the multilinear extension method to the
Alonso–Fiestras value , and also to a “counterpart” value M = ϕ βm introduced
by Amer et al. (2002). In Puente (2000) it is shown that the binomial semivalues can
be computed in a way very close to that of the Banzhaf value. Giménez (2001) and
Amer and Giménez (2003) prove that (a) any other semivalue requires using a geo-
metrical reference system of the semivalue simplex, given by any n different binomial
semivalues, and a linear map whose matrix depends on (the partial derivatives of the
multilinear extension of) the game and the reference system—it also applies, of course,
to the Shapley value, with no integration step—, and (b) the homogeneous coalitional
semivalues can be computed by means of a bilinear form whose matrix depends, again,
on the game and the reference system. It is worthy mentioning here that in the case
of coalitional binomial semivalues (Carreras and Magaña 1994) procedure applies as
well.
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